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Abstract
Mediatization has become more relevant in exploring relations between media and politics in 
post-Suharto Indonesia. However, the media’s role as the fourth estate of democracy has been 
hijacked by wealthy politicians and political parties. As a result, most mainstream media have 
failed to enhance public debates democratically. Based on existing mediatization literature, 
politico-economy analysis, and data collected through extensive in-depth interviews and relevant 
documents in the 2013-2015 period, this article theoretically aims to develop the mediatization 
concept and explore the degree of mediatization of politics in contemporary Indonesia.
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Abstrak
Mediatisasi menjadi lebih relevan dalam menjelajahi relasi media dan politik di Indonesia paska Soeharto. 
Namun, media sebagai pilar keempat demokrasi telah dibajak oleh elit dan partai politik oligarkis. Akibatnya, 
media mainstream gagal mendorong perdebatan publik secara demokratis. Berdasarkan literatur mediatisasi 
dan analisis ekonomi-politik, data wawancara mendalam serta dokumen relevan pada periode 2013-2015, 
artikel ini secara teoritis bertujuan mengembangkan konsep mediatisasi dan mengekplorasi tingkat 
mediatisasi politik di Indonesia kontemporer.
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Introduction
Mass media and social media in post-
Suharto Indonesia have significantly played a 
central role in promoting the democratic public 
sphere and monitoring the ruling government. It 
should be noted that the media have essentially 
been disseminating information, constructing 
public opinions and facilitating citizens and 
politicians at the local and national levels for 
political aspirations, public debates, and even 
for collective actions, participatory culture, and 
civic engagement among netizens and civil 
society activism (Arifuddin, 2014; Nugroho & 
Syarif, 2012 Lim, 2013; Nugroho, 2007, 2008). 
Social and political activism have been covered 
by the media and have gradually led to more 
democratic, transparent and responsible 
governance.
Since the late 1990s until the mid-2010s, 
the political debates and social activism that 
had been widely covered by the media, either 
through traditional mainstream media or 
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Pol i t i ca l ly  speaking ,  the  media 
in Indonesia`s Post-1998 democracy have 
hardly challenged the domination of political 
institutions and actors, hence it is not fully 
promoting its logic as the fourth estate of 
democracy and tends to compromise with 
oligarchic political parties and actors linked 
to the post-authoritarian legacy instead. This 
Indonesian case is not unique as similar cases 
can be observed to occur globally in a number 
of countries as a result of the development of 
the media sector’s interconnectedness with 
oligarchic networks of the transnational state. 
Critics indeed blamed the media for distorting 
the democratic processes in American politics 
regarding media coverage of the Lewinsky-
Clinton affair, the 1997 electoral victory 
of Labour leader Tony Blair in the United 
Kingdom, the 1989 victory of Fernando Collor 
de Mello in the Brazillian presidential elections, 
and the performance of Silvio Berlusconi, 
a media tycoon, in the 1994 Italian general 
election (Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999). 
In Indonesia, political parties such 
as Golkar and Nasdem have mainly been 
determining mainstream media`s opinions 
during political events since the second term 
of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
(SBY) until today. Mieztner (2015) mentioned 
this period as the decline of democracy after 
Reformasi. Even worse, those two political 
parties have continuously been occupied by 
powerful elites, e.g. Abu Rizal Bakrie and 
Surya Paloh who own several media such as 
TV One and Metro TV, and they consequently 
utilized those media in favor of their interests 
leading to useless debates and disproportional 
political control by the media (Lim, 2012). 
They colonized public opinion favoring certain 
political parties and benefiting a number of 
elites to win the national and local elections 
and contestation. Regarding the matter, 
Manuel Castells states that in the current era, 
financial flows take control of media empires 
that influence political processes and they are 
new internet-based media, confirmed the 
contestation of media and political logic in 
Indonesia. In the post-1998 democracy, a variety 
of public debates have radically advanced 
Indonesian democracy in the sense of promoting 
civil politics and enforcing democratic laws and 
regulations that indicate democratic transition 
and consolidation processes such as freedom of 
press, broadcasting reform, and election reform 
(Armando, 2011; Harris and Forresti, 2011). 
This situation continues into the current era of 
President Joko Widodo`s populism alongside 
the social movement played mostly by lower 
class groups and civil society organizations 
by using both mainstream media outlets and 
internet-based media (i.e., online and social 
media)to foster more democratic agendas in 
curbing corruption and criticizing oligarchs 
and cartel parties (Mietzner, 2015; Aspinall, 
2013). This period ultimately indicated not 
only the contestation between reformists and 
conservative actors based on complex power 
relations, but to some degree, it also initiated 
the intensive process of mediatization of 
politics wherein media interaction with politics 
became more powerful and dominating in 
contemporary Indonesia. Mediatization refers 
to a change process through which the media 
have become increasingly influential.
The emerging revolution of information 
and communication technologies (ICTs) such 
as the internet and social media in the last 
decades has triggered mediatization of society 
and politics. As a result of this globalization 
trend, political realms are intensively more 
mediatized. Most of the media in terms of 
medium per se and contents have creatively 
transformed into integrated parts of society, 
culture, and politics, and are therefore 
intensively interplayed against each other 
(Hjarvard, 2008; Stromback, 2008). ICTs even 
sparked the information era that led to the 
rise of network society and ultimately vibrant 
political and cultural sensibilities of present 
social movements (Castells, 2010).
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the privileged instruments of power (Castells, 
2010).
Most people have been silenced over 
such form of colonization because the operation 
process is subtly hegemonic. In this sense, this 
interference ultimately contributed to the public`s 
decreasing access to information, the under-
representation of certain groups, and the making 
of media fantasy reality afterward (Lim, 2012). 
Nevertheless, a few critical citizens, netizens and 
CSOs have creatively taken democracy back and 
criticized this colonization in the recent offline 
and online deliberation through social media 
and civil society activism, productive debates, 
political mobilization, etc. They have not only 
criticized political parties and oligarchic processes 
but also offered alternative perspectives of 
political ideas and practices. 
This article would like to address the 
question of why political parties have vested 
interests in controlling the post New Order 
media. It is consequently necessary to explore 
the political economy of the media since the 
last period of Suharto’s regime until today`s 
post-1998 democracy and the degree of 
the mediatization of politics involving the 
interaction between the political parties and the 
media to determine not only the dynamics of 
power relations but also to track current media 
development in Indonesia. The significance 
of this article would thus contribute to not 
only introducing the mediatization concept 
in terms of integrating media, culture, and 
politics to enrich the horizon of political and 
communication studies in Indonesia,  but 
also to initiating and spurring particularly 
dynamic mediatization debate in Indonesia 
which still has not been properly addressed in 
the Indonesian literature. This article employs 
literature of politics and media communication 
studies based on data from semi-structured 
interviews and relevant documentation and 
media contents from internet-based media such 
as youtube, online and social media within the 
period of 2013-2015.
Theoretical Framework
A Discussion on the Mediatization of 
Politics
The mediatization concept has been 
incredibly elaborated by a number of scholars 
(Hjarvard, 2008; Schulz, 2004; Stromback, 
2008) and it denotes an inherently process-
oriented concept of intertwining media, 
politics, culture, modernity, and social change. 
This term historically refers to  a process where 
a group of people increase their influence at 
the expense of others (Strömbäck & Dimitrova, 
2011). However, as an academic term it was 
initially applied to media’s impact on political 
communication and other effects on politics, 
and it was initiated by the Swedish academic 
Ken Asp (1986) to describe mediatization of 
political life as a process whereby a political 
system to a high degree is influenced by and 
adjusted to the demands of the mass media 
in their coverage of politics. In the same light, 
Altheide and Snow (1979, 1988) call for an 
analysis of social institutions-transformed-
through-media, and Mazzoleni and Schulz 
(1999) applied the concept of mediatization to 
media’s influence on politics (Hjarvard, 2008).
To precisely understand the term 
mediatization, a separation between the 
concept of mediatization and mediation is 
necessary. This concept comes close to the 
concept of mediation as the larger process of 
media influence on the social world which has 
also been elaborated by some scholars such as 
Altheide and Snow, 1988; Bennett and Entman, 
2001; Couldry, 2008; Davis, 2007; Nimmo and 
Combs, 1983; and Silverstone, 2007. According 
to Livingstone, scholars from continental 
Europe prefer the term mediatization whereas 
American and British scholars prefer the 
term mediation. However, mediatization 
and mediation are not synonymous because 
mediation has another meaning as the rather 
neutral process of transmitting messages 
(Strömbäck & Dimitrova, 2011).
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This concept gains a more contemporary 
political perspective under the mediatization of 
politics term elaborated by Jespers Stromback 
through which the media have become 
increasingly independent from politics and 
through which political actors and institutions 
have become increasingly dependent on the 
media. Although mediatization of politics has a 
multidimensional concept, it could be identified 
through four dimensions which pertain to 
politics and media influence  (Stromback & 
Van Aelst, 2013).
The first dimension is related to the extent 
to which the media constitute the most important 
source of information and communication. 
The second dimension describes the media’s 
independence from other social institutions, 
not least political institutions. The third 
dimension is concerned with media content 
and the extent to which media content is 
governed by media logic or political logic. The 
last dimension explores political actors and the 
degree to which they are governed by media 
logic or political logic (Strömbäck & Dimitrova, 
2011; Stromback, 2008). For this purpose, those 
four stages of mediatization of politics theory 
is not only relevant but also necessary to be 
cultivated in Indonesia.
The Mediatization of Politics in Indonesia`s 
Post-1998 Democracy
Mediatization is currently a relevant 
perspective in understanding the intensive 
relations between media and politics in 
contemporary democracy (Stromback, 2008) 
including in the Indonesian context and 
situation. This phenomenon will be the rational 
consequence of the development of information, 
communication and technology throughout the 
world and Indonesia as well. The trend has 
already started since Suharto’s era in which 
it began to intensively develop following 
Suharto’s resignation from his authoritarian 
regime and even more so in the advent of 
democratic governances that have been 
promoting media freedom and more media 
industry since the Habibie administration in 
1998 until today`s Jokowi era. 
This mediatization process in Indonesia 
could be better explained by understanding 
the complex processes of media development 
under the Suharto era that led to present media 
performance. It can be critically said that the 
media industry is successively related to the 
post-authoritarian legacy in which status quo 
elites who adopted the Indonesian New Order 
mannerism and ideas are politico-economically 
still in power contestations hand in hand 
with colonization of the media sector in the 
pursuit of other areas of power (Robinson & 
Hadiz, 2004). That is why the politico-economy 
analysis of the media industry regarding the 
final period of the New Order and the present 
media sector is essentially being explored as 
a foundation in interpreting more mediatized 
politics in post-1998 democracy.
Broadly speaking, mediatization is an 
assortment of complex political communication 
processes that explore relations between 
politics and media by taking political and 
media logic into account in favor of democracy. 
Despite its connection, this term should be 
distinguished from the concept of mediation in 
which politics occupies the media to spread 
political information and communication 
between the governors and the governed. This 
theoretically relates to the elaboration of Ben 
Anderson (Anderson, 2006), Walter Lippman 
(Lippman, 1922) and a number of scholars in 
their recent studies to politically describe media 
contribution and intervention toward the 
imagination of nation-state and construction 
of public opinion (Stromback, 2008).
The stage of the mediation of politics 
tends to justify the power of ruling elites 
leading to critical criticism among left-leaning 
intellectuals by using political economy 
analysis to challenge media ownership and 
also question the degree of media autonomy. In 
this sense, mediation of politics since Suharto’s 
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regime is truly relevant and becomes a part of 
the long mediatization processes that seek to 
enhance the potential democratic role of the 
media.
Nonetheless, the first three phases of 
mediatization of politics are relevant and 
could likely explain the political situation and 
Indonesian media outlets in post-authoritarian 
Indonesia. Mediatization mainly discusses the 
contestation between political logic and media 
logic in the public sphere. Indeed, the first stage 
of the mediatization process is approximate to 
the mediation process of Indonesian politics 
whereby media became the dominant source 
of political information that could be easily 
intervened by Suharto and his political cronies. 
The Indonesian context had been absolutely 
mediated during the Suharto era through TVRI, 
RRI, and Private television networks since those 
media were politically controlled by Suharto 
and his cronies.
The second process pertains to the 
attempt of the media in Indonesia to survive 
and become more professional and also more 
commercialized-pragmatic with the advent 
of the Reformasi (reform) era in 1998. As a 
consequence, both conservative and reformist 
political actors improved their capacities and 
skills to adapt to pragmatic media logic, but 
those actors to some extent remained politically 
subordinate under media autonomy. The period 
from the Reformasi era in 1998 up to the advent 
of the first new democratic election in the post-
authoritarian regime in 1999 also reflected 
this stage with the emergence of hundreds of 
media news; print media, electronic media, and 
internet-based media.
Since 1999-2015, the third process of 
mediatization of politics had been gradually 
approaching and determining political realms 
in Indonesia in terms of media contents, political 
visions, and the representation of spin doctors 
in political events which was more dominant 
elsewhere under the coming age of instant 
communication (Brewin, 2002; McNair, 2007). 
Spin doctors could be maintained and played 
by pollsters, journalists, retired politicians, 
officials, campaign and communication 
consultants, and academicians in today`s 
public relations democracy (Louw, 2005). The 
practice of spin doctors has also been incredibly 
appearing and operating more dynamically, 
either independent or full of vested interested, 
during the Indonesian elections since 1999 until 
today. Therefore, these various actor shave in a 
way contributed to promoting more advanced 
democracy in Indonesia by conducting trusted 
polling, enforcing law, transparency, and 
more participation in the electoral democracy. 
However, they also created hurdles which 
held democracy back in the process since they 
totally manipulated polling and exploited some 
candidates or being exploited themselves by 
obsessive candidates who provided money 
through corruption as can be seen in some 
private television networks, Youtube videos 
and many other social media outlets today.
Moreover, polling organizations that 
have emerged post reform, transformed 
Indonesia’s electoral democracy to not 
only be more transparent and qualified in 
controlling and watching any elections but 
also to be more paradoxical in which some 
polling organizations, for example Pusat 
Kajian Kebijakan dan Pembangunan Strategis 
(Puskaptis), tended to manipulate quick count 
to support Prabowo Subianto and Hatta Rajasa 
in the 2014 presidential election. Whereas 
Centre for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS), Lingkaran Survei Indonesia (LSI), and 
Saiful Mujani Research Center (SMRC) showed 
different quick count results that are regarded 
to be more trustworthy since their organizations 
are deemed more credible and capable.
 Some notable polling organizations in 
Indonesia are Resource Productivity Center 
(RPC), International Foundation for Election 
Systems (IFES), LP3ES, Litbang Harian Kompas, 
and KPP-Lab Politik UIin the 1999 election, 
Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI), Pusat Pengkajian 
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Islam dan Masyarakat (PPIM), Soegeng Sarjadi 
Syndicated (SSS), Danareksa Research Institute 
(DRI) in the 2004 election, and many more 
media, think tanks, and polling organizations 
under Perhimpunan Survei Opini Publik Indonesia 
(PERSEPI) and Asosiasi Riset Opini Publik 
(AROPI) during the 2009 and 2014 elections 
such as Indonesia Research Center (IRC), Pusat 
Kajian Kebijakan dan Pembangunan Strategis 
(Puskaptis), Lembaga Survei Nasional (LSN), and 
Jaringan Suara Indonesia (JSI), Litbang Kompas, 
Lingkaran Survei Indonesia (LSI), Indikator Politik 
Indonesia, Populi Center, Centre for Strategic 
and International Studies (CSIS), Radio Republik 
Indonesia (RRI) and Saiful Mujani Research 
Center (SMRC).
Spin doctors used TV channels to spread 
their political opinions since TV is the most 
popular media and it is massively consumed 
by the Indonesian people by 91.68 in 2012 
in order to influence large audience. Polling 
organizations and think tanks at the time played 
central roles to emphasize bandwagon and 
underdog effects in any political events. They 
ultimately determined public opinion in the 
mass media especially in private TV channels 
despite the presence of some investigative 
media such as Tempo and Kompas that are 
relatively more autonomous in terms of news 
reporting and opinion formation. For example, 
during the 2014 election, TV One, along with 
some polling organizations such as Puskaptis, 
vulgarly supported Prabowo Subianto and 
Hatta Rajasa by covering their candidacy 
more and partly manipulating the quick count 
results in their programs which contradicted 
independent journalism principles as well 
as autonomous critical thinking that we can 
frequently observe in and is commonly utilized 
by Kompas and Tempo along with a number 
of capable pollsters such as LSI, SMRC, CSIS, 
etc.
Polling organizations are strictly 
regulated by a legitimate organization called 
Persepi (Perhimpunan Survei Opini Publik 
Indonesia, Association of Public Opinion 
Survey). However, some polling organizations 
such as Indonesia Research Center (IRC), Pusat 
Kajian Kebijakan dan Pembangunan Strategis 
(Puskaptis), Lembaga Survei Nasional (LSN), 
and Jaringan Suara Indonesia (JSI) vulgarly 
supported the candidacy of Prabowo Subianto 
and Hatta Rajasa in the 2014 election. They 
subsequently released their quick count results 
and it consequently made Prabowo-Hatta 
to confidently declare their victory by quick 
count in TV One1. However, PBHI sued these 
pollsters for the manipulation2 and also Persepi 
strictly dismissed Puskaptis and JSI from the 
organization.3
In this third phase of mediatization of 
politics, the spin doctors, think tanks and 
polling organizations were political actors 
and institutions and they truly created pseudo 
politics and fantasy realities for supporting 
their candidates or any elites` interests. Those 
spin actors and institutions in a number of 
elections in post-reform Indonesia represented 
the interests of the elites and political parties 
throughout the mainstream media owned by 
wealthy politicians such as Abu Rizal Bakri, 
Surya Paloh, and Harry Tanusudibyo. They 
speak in the mainstream media in order to set 
political agenda that would lead to meet the 
interests of political parties. However, other 
alternative media operated by critical activists 
and free writers attempted to respond by 
opposing this situation and promoting media 
logic of the last mediatization and public 
supremacy by using internet-based media such 
as indoprogress.com, jakartabeat.net, and the 
latest new comers: Islambergerak.com and 
qureta.com.
1 This victory`s declaration by quick count can be seen here 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JbKcGdh6XVw
2 This issue is accessed here https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=7lrFtsHhA68
3 This can be seen here https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=9FQQKdRSAK0
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As a result, critically thinking stakeholders 
such as public intellectuals, CSO activists, 
student organizations responded to those 
politicizations by spreading true information 
based on cover both side journalism, critical 
thinking and democratic principles to keep 
democracy on the right track. They achieved 
this by criticizing political parties, elites, 
spin doctors and the mainstream media via 
alternative internet-based media such as online 
and social media and also by condemning 
mainstream media for not being valid and 
completely colonized by oligarchic elites and 
their political parties as well as frequently 
being the mouthpiece of oligarchic networks 
in political events. Politically speaking, every 
political group and party are supposed to 
promote their candidates, ideas, identities and 
stance within the political reality and discourse 
in Indonesia to radicalize democracy (Laclau & 
Mouffe, 1988; Norris, 2006), but unfortunately 
they tended to glorify racism and enhance 
sectoral interests. Thus, each group in Indonesia 
needs to radically consider their involvement 
and participation in the long term political 
practice and discourse with a more rational and 
visionary approach to weaken and eliminate 
oligarchic networks and also to promote a more 
advanced democracy in Indonesia.
The last stage of mediatization has not 
taken place in contemporary Indonesia. But it 
is ideally and clearly described as the process in 
which media carry out the supremacy of media 
logic in promoting democracy from, by, and for 
the public. Any political actors and institutions 
are expected to adapt, adopt, and internalize 
the media logic as the foundation of democracy 
and regard it as the mind of the public. 
Media would ultimately supervise political 
dynamics through their professionalism and 
worthiness. 
Civil actors support this media logic so 
that the media are able to strategically and 
ideally play their role. Any political actions 
that ignore media logic would be a failure since 
media are on the right track as the guardian 
and fourth estate of democracy that is based 
philosophically on the foundation of rational, 
critical thinking, journalism principles and 
public support that promote equality, freedom, 
and public interests. In the 2014 Indonesian 
presidential election case, Prabowo Subianto 
and Hatta Rajasa under their allied parties and 
oligarchic elites blatantly delegitimized and 
manipulated media principles and power for 
their vested interests, particularly by exploiting 
TV One for their candidacy and campaign 
since TV One is owned by Abu Rizal Bakri, 
Prabowo`s supporter. Whereas, Joko Widodo 
and Jusuf Kalla along with their supporters 
and volunteers claimed victory and garnered 
sympathy in the 2014 campaign and election 
from the public and the media since they were 
well-respected and adapted to media logic. In 
the end, media truly became more political and 
powerful along with other social and political 
movements by consistently promoting media 
logic not for the interests of others but for the 
sake of democracy as observed in media such 
as Kompas, Tempo, and in organizations such 
as Indonesian Corruption Watch, Lembaga 
Bantuan Hukum, Transparency International 
Indonesia, Nahdatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, 
etc. Nevertheless, this last perspective is yet to 
be fully achieved in Indonesia`s contemporary 
democracy.
Regarding this  apex of  pol i t ical 
mediatization, Indonesia has not fully 
experienced this situation by considering the 
roles of mainstream media. A number of reasons 
are, firstly, Indonesia has hardly escaped from 
the post-New Order legacy such as oligarchic 
nodes and networks that remain in power to 
pursue economic profit (Robinson & Hadiz, 
2004). Secondly, Indonesia media have yet to 
fully advance into becoming democratic actors 
comparable to media in western developed 
countries in conducting investigative reports, 
challenging regimes and mostly being part of 
any reform and movement.
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Finally, the last phase of mediatization is 
still in its infancy in the Indonesian context with 
some conditions that ought to be fulfilled such 
as the enhancement of democratic ideas and 
practices, the commitment of political actors 
and institutions, the improvement of media 
performance, and the full support from pro-
democratic actors to fight against colonization 
over the media. This last mediatization process 
could realistically transform the current 
Indonesian democracy.
Method and Data
This article employs a qualitative approach 
to interpret and explore challenges of media 
democratization in Indonesia. The qualitative 
method is considered relevant since it can 
interpret socio-political phenomena and historical 
context (Cassel & Simon, 2004; Cresswell, 2007). 
The data were collected through documents 
from various media including youtube videos 
and extensive in-depth interviews of seven 
individuals namely Satrio Arismunandar 
(AJI-Aliansi Jurnalis Independen, Alliance of 
Independent Journalists, Ex-Kompas and 
TransTV), Gh (An anynomous RCTI Official), 
Donist (An anynomous TVRI official), Agus 
Sudibyo (Media Researcher, Ex-ISAI (Institut 
Studi Arus Informasi, Information Studies Institute 
activist and ex-Press Council member in 2010-
2013), Judhariksawan (KPI commissioner), Idi 
Muzayyad (KPI commissioner), A.S Hikam 
(Academician and Ex-Minister of Research 
and Technology under Abdurrahman Wahid`s 
Presidency). Political-economy and mediatization 
perspective will be critically used to consider 
historical and contemporary context in data 
analysis and literature.
Results
Political-economy of Indonesian Media 
since the Suharto Era 
Why does understanding the media sector 
under the New Order politico-economically 
and historically lead to better mediatization 
analysis? The corrupt regime of the New 
Order could be seen as the main cause of 
today`s colonization of oligarchic power in 
contemporary Indonesia. Suharto’s regime 
implemented the soviet style in managing 
information and communication resources and 
in colonizing people and the political order. The 
soviet style refers to the practice of controlling 
media under an authoritarian regime in which 
media along with any organizations are 
controlled and forced to serve the authoritarian 
regime and respect its cronies (Esarey & Xiao, 
2011). The colonization process happened in 
the interest of the New Order wherein the 
media and broadcasting sectors were utilized 
simply as state agents serving the ruling elites 
and party. 
The colonization becomes more dynamic 
in present day Indonesia as seen in political 
contestation amongst media, elites, activists, 
civil society groups, students, and so forth 
as well as under cartel politics involving 
oligarchic political parties (Hikam, interview 
on September 22nd 2015). This intensified 
colonization by involving the media`s role in 
politics and society could be noted as the third 
stage of mediatization of politics and society in 
which the media hardly played any transitional 
and dialogical role in accommodating and 
changing the apex of political logic into media 
logic of democracy. Media were constrained 
by the oligarchic elites` interests in attempting 
to construct a democratic public opinion but 
pseudo political reality. Even though the media 
have hardly enforced their logic regarding 
freedom of speech, equality, cosmopolitanism, 
democratic human rights, etc. upon political 
institutions and society since the arrival of 
Reformasi in 1998 until today, the media`s 
interaction and penetration over political life 
became incredibly more important within 
social and political life under the democratic 
regime and the prevalence of internet and social 
media technology. 
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The development of the Indonesian 
media sector is mainly related to historical 
sociology of the politico-economic power 
and media ownership under the Suharto 
era that significantly influenced subsequent 
media debate, particularly regarding media 
autonomy which had incredibly transformed 
into becoming more democratic in search 
of democracy, polity, and civility during 
the post-authoritarian Indonesia period 
(Sen & Hill, 2007).The media sector has 
significantly developed and enjoyed freedom 
of press post-1998 as a result of the struggle 
and legal achievements of pro-democracy 
groups, experts, and professionals (Satrio 
Arismunandar, Ex-Kompas and Trans TV 
journalist interview on September 19th 2015). 
The progress could be noted by considering 
the number of active media, the condition 
wherein the state no longer monitors and 
strictly censors the press and any media 
particularly under the Abdurahman Wahid 
administration, and the enactment of Press 
Law No. 40/1999 and the Broadcasting Law 
No. 32/2002, etc. Nevertheless, the media sector 
has been hindered by market-oriented vision 
of business interests and politically challenged 
by uncivilized groups controlled by the elites` 
interests. In this sense, Heryanto and Hadiz 
assumed that the media have been relatively 
liberalized but unprotected (Ariel Heryanto & 
Hadiz, 2005).
The broadcasting media, both state-
owned and private media outlets, have long 
developed on its own during the Suharto 
regime (1965-1998) and was liberalized in 
post-1998 democracy, but as of current they 
remain vulnerable to politically vested interests 
and have yet to become the autonomous-
professional media it is expected to be (Donist, 
interview on October 21st, 2013). TVRI, as an 
example, has been utilized by Suharto since 
the beginning of the New Order to propagate 
state`s interests of developmentalism, Pancasila 
and anti-communism under military-civilian 
coalition in certain periods and circumstances 
(Aspinall, 2005), but it remained to be politicized 
by the ruling elites toward the 2014 election.
After the political turmoil in 1965, the 
Suharto regime focused on initiating the 
national development agendas and using 
the revenue from the oil boom to implement 
several extraordinary economic development 
programs that require political stabilization 
(Vatikiotis, 2003). The media were consequently 
considered an effective tool for the regime in 
safeguarding various interests and development 
agendas, the media were thus utilized as agent 
of stabilization by the regime. Later, the media 
sector was also affected by the successful 
economic achievements of the regime which 
subsequently changed political discourse of 
the media into a commercially significant 
industry during the 1970s-1980s. Then, Suharto 
gradually forced any media to become more 
re-politicized in the 1990s, hand in hand with 
the rising critical thinking middle class in 
Indonesia (Sen & Hill, 2007).
The Suharto regime had been inclined to 
control and monitor the potentiality of print 
media criticism since its early days when the 
broadcasting sector was easily colonized by 
the regime as state-owned apparatus and 
had acted as an agent of stability and nation-
building (McCargo, 2003). The reason is that 
the press such as newspapers and magazines 
had independently existed and potentially 
set political agendas in Indonesia (Sen & Hill, 
2007). For instance, in the late 1960s some print 
media such as Indonesia Raya, Harian Kami, 
Nusantara, and Mahasiswa Indonesia along with 
intellectuals and students enthusiastically 
campaigned against corruption and criticized 
the abuse of power. Similar movements 
happened when Japanese prime minister, 
Tanaka visited Indonesia in 1974. Media, 
students, and politicians seized the moment 
to criticize Suharto`s corruption, cronyism, 
and economic programs (Aspinall, 2005). As a 
result of this prolonged political criticism and 
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activism, Suharto consequently banned eleven 
newspapers and one magazine at the time. 
Suharto finally enforced press restrictions in the 
1980s and 1990s by banning three magazines 
i.e. Tempo, Detik, and Editor in 1994 (Sen & 
Hill, 2007).
In contrast to the press media, the state`s 
broadcasters, namely TVRI and RRI, had been 
preserved as the state`s apparatus. TVRI in 
the 1970s and 1980s were particularly very 
influential and important in supporting 
government policies and controlling public 
opinions (Armando, 2011). TVRI had three 
main goals under the New Order: firstly, the 
promotion of national unity and integration; 
secondly, the promotion of national stability; 
and thirdly, the promotion of political stability 
(Kitley, 2000). TVRI had no alternative and 
it emphasized the primacy of national 
development in the various economic, social, 
cultural, and political sectors, the pursuit of 
cultural and informational autonomy, the 
support for democracy, and the solidarity with 
other developing countries. Those functions 
were based on Suharto`s speech on the 24th 
of August 1982 which stipulated that TVRI 
as well as RRI are responsible to encourage 
nationalism, promote unity and integration, 
build national character and culture, and 
stimulate people`s participation in national 
development (Sudibyo et al, 2004).
TVRI was expected to be the state`s 
media in the beginning of New Order, 
nonetheless, TVRI broadcasted programs very 
well, it respected the public demands at the 
time, it provided inspiring media contents 
such as the children’s puppet series Si Unyil, 
the soap opera Rahmat Family, and the news 
program called Berita Nasional (Kitley, 2000). 
TVRI seemed to be successfully maintaining 
their programs because it had been regularly 
supplied with vast budget allocation and had 
no competitors. More importantly, TVRI had 
also remarkably raised substantial revenue 
from advertising and TV fees alongside the 
regular allocation of government subsidy 
(Armando, 2011). Unfortunately, TVRI as a 
potential democratic public media in the peak 
of regime performance was being scapegoated 
by elites` conflict and regime`s interest that 
led to the critical position. As such, in the 
annual presidential speech on the 5 th of 
January 1981, Suharto politically asked TVRI 
to stop advertising and be more concerned 
on development targets in the early 1980s 
in front of the DPR (Armando, 2011). At the 
same time, the oil boom of 1974 and late 1970s 
confidently encouraged Suharto to force this 
policy because the regime was able to provide 
the annual budget for TVRI. 
T h i s  d e c i s i o n  w a s  c o n s i d e r e d 
unreasonable for TVRI at the time since 
the potential business and advertisement 
income contributed more than 50 percent to 
its annual revenue which consequently made 
TVRI to gradually become a professional and 
autonomous broadcaster in serving the public 
(Kitlely, 200) and thereby more likely closer to 
the ideal performance of public-oriented media. 
By the early 1980s, TVRI had limited budget 
without advertising and barely provided any 
interesting programs for the public and it 
eventually became more dependent on the 
government. Suharto fully forced TVRI to be 
both the agent of stability and mouthpiece for 
the regime agenda rather than improving its 
potential to be a professional public service 
broadcaster. This situation also triggered the 
advent of private television media in the final 
period of Suharto’s reign. Suharto afforded the 
opportunity for his family and cronies to invest 
in the media industry. This chance was limited 
to trusted people. In other words, the private 
media outlets at the time were established in 
the hands of cronyistic businessmen oligarch 
that started to emerge in the late 1980s. The 
Suharto regime invited investment, involved 
their families and cronies and concurrently 
the middle class began to publicly appear in 
urban areas (Kitley, 2000). 
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The Media Industry and Suharto`s 
Cronyism
What is the impact of the media industry 
and how did it relate to the rise of the Suharto 
circle? Private media in Indonesia are the big 
industry and businesses that target economic 
profit. The early private media outlets in 
Indonesia were mostly owned by Suharto`s 
family and cronies.  RCTI belonged to Bambang 
Trihadmodjo, Suharto`s third child, at the 
helm of the Bimantara business group in 1990. 
The second private channel was SCTV in 
1989 wherein eighty per cent of the company 
shares were controlled by Henri Pribadi, a 
Chinese businessman and close friend to 
Suharto`s cousin, Sudwikatmono who owned 
the remaining 20 percent. The third private 
channel, TPI, was mostly owned by Siti 
Hardiyanti Rukmana, Suharto`s daughter in 
1990 (Sen and Hill, 2007).
Agus Sudibyo, a media researcher, ex-
ISAI (Institut Studi Arus Informasi, Information 
Studies Institute) activist and ex-Press Council 
member in 2010-2013 explained that Suharto 
had primarily underpinned his family and 
cronies to manage and gain benefits from 
private media outlets. In doing so, those media 
were easily controlled and directed to merely 
focus on the business agendas rather than 
political matters (Interview on October 25th 
2013). Those media supported the regime and 
their owners were inclined to get involved in 
rent seeking activities and be committed to the 
market rather than democratic role of media. 
Yet the media privatization of these networks 
was carried out through cronyism and later on 
they became trusted oligarchic networks that 
change day by day. That is why, several private 
media tended to refuse to pay back their debts 
to support TVRI as the public broadcaster 
in post-Authoritarian Indonesia based on a 
particular agreement in 2002.
Regarding the regime`s policy based 
on this development-liberalization agenda, 
Haryanto assumed that Suharto`s policies 
seemed to be inconsistent and contradicted 
with media control. At the one hand, Suharto`s 
cronies exploited media corporations, while on 
the other, the censorship over the media was 
still conducted by the Ministry of Information 
(Haryanto, 2007). However, any policies of the 
regime regarding the media sector is likely 
possible because the regime had economic 
interests and close relationships with the media 
owners.
Ownership of private media outlets have 
gradually changed from a simple one under 
Suharto’s era into more complex ownerships 
called mergers and acquisitions in the Post-
New Order era (Nugroho, Siregar and Laksmi, 
2012). Under the Suharto era, private media 
outlets and ownership completely functioned 
as puppets in serving the authoritarian regime 
wherein they performed no significant criticism 
and received more pressures from the public 
specifically from civil society groups in the 
media sector. Meanwhile, in post-Suharto 
Indonesia those private media are regulated 
by the Press and Broadcasting Law along 
with their regulatory institutions, namely the 
Press Council and Indonesian Broadcasting 
Commission called KPI as well as being 
controlled by the public and relevant civil 
society organizations. Nevertheless, media 
corporations` tendencies seemed slightly 
similar in terms of being colonized by the elites 
and political parties, being profit-oriented and 
having the tendency to overlook the democratic 
role of media to some extent (A Heryanto & 
Hadiz, 2005; Sudibyo, Andre and Aminuddin, 
2004). The ownership of private media such 
as TV networks had evidently facilitated the 
ruling elite and party to utilize such media for 
their electoral interests.
Media Reform Brings Uncertainty in the 
Post-New Order Era
Why has media reform following Reformasi 
brought about ambiguity? There is serious 
truth on the lack of insight into transformation 
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of media ownership and its implication without 
understanding of the transitional period. 
Indeed, the media landscape changed after 
Suharto`s downfall. Habibie consequently 
came to power and promoted media reform 
and democracy to open society (Ricklefs, 2001) 
amidst the contestation of status quo elites 
(Robinson and Hadiz, 2004). Meanwhile, civil 
society organizations advocated the media 
(Kitley, 2003) and called for civil collaboration 
among student movement activists, NGO 
activists, intellectuals, media journalists, etc. 
(Sudibyo, 2001).
In the middle of elites` contestation and 
criticism, Habibie promoted Press Law No. 
40/1999. As a result, the media dramatically 
transformed into a double-edged sword of 
market-oriented (Sudibyo, 2009) and public-
oriented media in Indonesia`s Post-1998 period 
(Nugroho et al, 2012). This regulation not only 
augmented media freedom and functional 
public sphere, but also provided legitimacy 
to professionally regulate the media industry 
in order to be more committed to the public. 
Subsequently, several media outlets and 
organizations were established under the 
Habibie regime as part of a national media 
reform and they developed from simple into 
complex businesses.
The minister of information, Muhammad 
Yunus, during the Habibie era attempted to 
truly create milestone reforms by “revoking the 
printing and publication permit called SIUPP, 
issuing over twelve hundred (1200) new print 
licenses, and approving the issue of five new 
commercial television licenses and more than 
nine hundred new commercial radio licenses, 
twenty-four officially recognized journalists’ 
association. Then, commercial radio stations’ 
obligation to relay state news was reduced 
to three bulletins a day. Radio and television 
stations reveled in the opportunity to produce 
their own news bulletins and present openly 
critical analyses of current affairs. Finally, 
during transitional period in 1998–9 both radio 
and television played an increasingly important 
role in mediating aspirations for greater 
democracy in Indonesia (Kitley, 2003).”
The mainstream media enjoyed this 
situation. Private televisions such as RCTI, SCTV, 
TPI became more powerful after becoming a 
more commercialized media. Two years later, 
Trans TV, Metro TV, TV Global, TV-7, and 
LATIVI had finally emerged. This time could 
be noted as the era when private television 
networks became more developed and started 
to play roles in the new democratic public 
sphere. In the meantime, the performance 
of TVRI in the Post-New Order period as a 
potential public-oriented media has been 
left behind by the other private-commercial 
networks in terms of attracting the public. CSOs 
in the media and broadcasting sector hoped 
that TVRI would become a more powerful 
and independent broadcaster promoting 
democratic debate and public interests. But 
that role has yet to be realized by TVRI and 
it has even become more dependent on the 
government budget that seemed to be more 
political in the DPR.
According to Gh, an RCTI official, most 
broadcasters should politico-economically 
adapt to the current situation as a result of the 
rise of information era. Audiences and social 
organizations preferences have significantly 
changed including their sensibility and 
expectations toward media programs (Interview 
on October 27th 2013). Private-commercial 
television networks with significant income 
revenues from advertising such as RCTI could 
provide programs that meet the audience needs. 
On the other hand, TVRI, after having lost its 
budget since Suharto’s era until the present day 
has been struggling to maintain its organization. 
Donist, a TVRI official, mentioned that TVRI 
would on occasion run out of budget to produce 
good programs. This is why TVRI frequently 
broadcasts mere reruns of its programs. Ironically, 
commercial TV has become more developed 
today while TVRI remains stagnant and in need 
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of innovation to survive and compete with others 
(Interview on October 21st 2013).
After the implementation of Broadcasting 
Law in 2002, according to article 13 (2), TVRI 
was transformed into a Lembaga Penyiaran 
Publik or LPP (Public Broadcasting Service) 
in order to strengthen its role in promoting 
national interests and democratic life. TVRI 
was previously a Perusahaan Jawatan (Perjan, 
Corporate Office) through the government 
regulation of PP No.36/2000 in which TVRI 
coordinated with the Minister of Finance. 
Then it changed into a Perseroan Terbatas 
(Limited Company) through PP No. 9/2002 
in order to return its advertisement program 
for profit, in which TVRI coordinated with 
the Minister of BUMN (Badan Usaha Milik 
Negara, State-Owned Enterprises) (Sudibyo et 
al, 2004). However, even with TVRI`s status 
as a Public Broadcasting Service promoting 
internal reform and enabling at least 15 percent 
for advertising programs as stipulated in the 
Broadcasting Law of 2002, the income from 
advertising remained insufficient to operate 
TVRI programs and TVRI depends heavily on 
the frequently unpunctual government budget 
(Donist, interview October 21st 2013).It seems 
that TVRI is unable to seize its time to become 
a great public broadcaster.
A m i d s t  t h e  c o m p l i c a t e d  m e d i a 
democratization agenda in the long term, 
private-commercial TV networks have focused 
more on business profit (Sudibyo et al, 2004), 
whilst TVRI as a public-oriented media 
appeared to be withering, and this is the reason 
why civil society actors need to practically 
observe the media sector and be engaged 
in improving potential media system as 
well as promoting democratic media policy, 
institutional reform, and media advocacy-
literacy movements.
The following table shows the economic 
landscape of Indonesian national television 
networks in 2011.
From the six groups of ten private 
national television networks above, “MNC 
group appears to be the most powerful 
broadcasters with the highest share of 36.7 
percent consisting of RCTI, Global TV, and 
MNCTV. Whilst TVRI has a market share of 
only 1.4 percent of the total share. Yet, the 
concentration of television network ownership 
Table 1. 
The Landscape of Indonesian National Television
TV Channel First on Air Status Market Share %
TVRI 1962 State/Independent 1.4 1.4
RCTI 1987 Merged (MNC) 19 
36.7Global TV 2001 Merged (MNC)  5.1
MNCTV 
(Formerly TPI)+ 
1990 Merged (MNC) 12.6 
SCTV 1989 Merged (EMTEK)+ 17.3 31.5
Indosiar 1995 Merged (EMTEK)+ 14.2 
Trans TV 2001 Merged (TransCorp) 12.1    18.5
Trans 7 2001, 
re-launch in 2006
Merged (TransCorp)  6.4 
TV One 
(formerly Lativi) 
2001 Merged (Bakrie/MM Group)+ 4.5
 8.7
ANTV 1993 Merged (Bakrie/MM Group)+ 
 
 4.2 
METROTV 2000 Media Group/Independent 1.9  1.9
Source: Lim (2011)
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in Indonesia results from the practice of 
mergers and consolidation of media businesses 
as a logical consequence of media liberalization, 
but it is partly not favorable in terms of 
media democratization (Lim, 2011).”In other 
words, TVRI is supposedly more engaged in 
promoting sustainable media democratization, 
but its economic power and resources are 
completely weak. As such, the public depends 
more on the kindness of private media outlets 
to democratize the public sphere.
In that sense, Lim emphasized the 
probable negative impact of such private media 
ownership in the long term toward media 
democratization due to a lack of competition. 
The small amount of media companies firmly 
dominate the media industry and they have 
created a media oligopoly that contributed 
to biased political contents (Lim, 2011). 
However, ownership interventions over media 
organizations and contents mostly happen at 
the national level in which the media industry 
and conglomeration massively operates. At 
the local level, media interference remains 
unconcerned about media conglomeration, 
instead it is apparently being operated by local 
politicians in hegemonic cooperation with the 
media.
The biased media intensively appeared 
during Indonesian elections at local and 
national level since 2009 until 2014. Indeed, 
some scholars are more concerned on real 
media freedom today in which Indonesia 
still needs more of especially those relating to 
political issues. However, a more important 
issue is the recent situation regarding media 
performance upon gaining media freedom 
under complex oligarchic politics. This is also 
the rational argument for the presence of KPI, 
which should be supported by CSOs in the 
media sector, in regulating and observing 
the media industry in Post-Authoritarian 
Indonesia. In the meantime, internet-based 
alternative media which essentially are online 
and social media have emerged to support 
CSOs` activism in carrying out present offline 
and online functions by criticizing the ruling 
elites and promoting democracy throughout 
all sectors in both the virtual and real world in 
contemporary Indonesia. 
Media Democratization and KPI`s Role in 
Controlling Undemocratic Tendencies of 
Private Media
Why couldn’t KPI control the private 
media? The main reason behind political 
parties` colonization toward media life in post-
Suharto Indonesia is the oligarchic networks 
of wealthy politicians that occupied political 
parties’ demands to control political life since 
they have become more powerfully organized. 
At the same time, this colonization operates 
with the lack of media democratization 
carried out by KPI (Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia, 
Indonesian Broadcasting Commission) along 
with civil society.     
Nevertheless, KPI to some extent has 
already played a significant role in reinforcing 
the democratic role of the media particularly 
in terms of contents and ownership of 
broadcasting media. This could potentially 
foster media supremacy as the fourth estate of 
democracy wherein KPI mediates media logic 
in controlling political life and society. KPI has 
contributed in the transitional third stage of 
mediatization of politics in Indonesia in which 
the media are supposedly striving to influence 
and transform politics and culture to be more 
democratic.
KPI is an independent institution as 
stipulated by the Broadcasting Law 32/2002. 
It is established at the national and local level 
to promote media democratization in Post-
New Order Indonesia. Public regulations, 
especially regarding the broadcasting sector, 
have been regulated in the broadcasting law 
but a number of revisions remain necessary. 
Judhariksawan and Idi Muzayyad, KPI`s 
commissioners, explained that the complex 
political circumstances related to business 
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and elites` interests make it difficult to have 
the law fully implemented as of current. KPI 
has indeed attempted to negotiate with all 
involved stakeholders particularly the Ministry 
of Information and Communication, private 
media and decision makers during the ongoing 
revision of this law in order to evaluate the law 
and prepare for the next media democratization 
agendas (Interview on September 19th 2013).
The table 2 below shows the main 
challenges of KPI in media democratization as 
stipulated by the Broadcasting Law 32/2002.
In summary, KPI is faced with three 
challenges. First, KPI has no full authority 
over media license of broadcasters which 
significantly affects its relations toward media 
conglomeration. Second, KPI could barely 
manage media monopoly and cross-ownership 
because not only does KPI operate based on 
a weak rule of law and legitimacy, but those 
media monopoly and cross-ownership are 
subtly backed up by political parties and their 
elites. Third, KPI could not insist national 
private media to establish NSS (Network 
Station System) considering coverage areas and 
distributing knowledge and capacities because 
those media argue that they do not have the 
resources to establish network stations in each 
province. However, the reasoning behind the 
media’s reluctance and lack of enthusiasm to 
democratize the media sector in the Post-New 
Order era is because they gain a huge sum of 
money from the prevailing system and at the 
same time their position is rather strong being 
backed up by oligarchic politicians.
According to Gh, an RCTI official, the 
Broadcasting Law based regulation is not 
relevant and suitable to private television 
networks’ interests. In truth, this law restricts 
private television networks to gain greater profit 
and enforces them to be more fully concerned 
on serving the public (Interview on October 
27th 2013). KPI, based on the Broadcasting Law, 
needs to strictly regulate the private television 
networks to adapt to democratic values implied 
in the law such as diversity of owners and 
contents that accommodate public demands in 
terms of social, cultural, and economic contents 
at the local and national level.
In fact, private television networks have 
not established the Sistem Siaran Berjaringan 
(National Station System) as stipulated by the 
broadcasting law in which private national media 
organizations such as RCTI, SCTV, TV One, 
etc. should establish local stations, build their 
infrastructure, and provide human resources 
in each province in Indonesia. Even worse, 
private television networks have yet to respond 
completely to any public criticism regarding 
media contents that contradict with social 
values and political rules such as pornography, 
mystic-oriented movies/programs or political 
campaign by political parties and figures. Article 
5 provides information, to some extent, regarding 
the meaning of media democratization in the 
law advocated by KPI and CSOs in the media 
sector:  
Table 2. 
Article 5 of the Broadcasting Law 
No. 32/2002
No. Democratic Broadcasting Objectives: Indonesian Values and Culture 
1 To respect Pancasila & UUD 1945, 
2 To build national characters, 
3 To develop human capacity,
4 To promote national unity and 
integrity,
5 To encourage discipline and 
enforcement of law,
6 To support freedom of expression, 
participatory development, and 
environmental sustainability, 
7 To end monopoly and advocate good 
competition,
8 To increase social wellbeing, social 
equality, and national competitive 
advantage,
9 To provide credible information, cover 
both side and be responsible,
10 To promote national culture.
Source:  Author modified from The Broadcasting 
Law No 32/2002 Article 5 
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KPI has been truly supported by Civil 
Society Organizations (CSOs) to promote the 
broadcasting law, but their support is still 
incapable of compelling private media outlets 
to fully comply to it. The reason for this is that 
KPI has no legal standing to being a powerful 
regulator that imposes sanctions such as in 
issuing warnings and stopping media licenses 
of any private television network if they do not 
adhere to the law. Thus, reformist politicians are 
still lobbying DPR to revise that law while CSOs 
in the media sector are still finding it difficult 
advocating the public interests and promoting 
media literacy due to financial issues. It is without 
a doubt that they are in need of a lot more support 
from the grassroots community.
Conclusion
Mediatization of politics is proven to 
be operating in Indonesia under political and 
informational circumstances. Indeed, the politico-
economy analysis based on the school of critical 
theory is the most useful and provides the 
deepest perspective in understanding social and 
political phenomena including the media sector 
by mainly identifying and recognizing that media 
conglomerations today are owned, maintained, 
and utilized by oligarchic political parties rooted 
in the legacy of the Suharto’s authoritarian regime. 
According to Hadiz (V. R. Hadiz, 2004, 2008; V. 
Hadiz, 2003; A Heryanto & Hadiz, 2005), the 
structure of Indonesian politics remains strongly 
imbued by the New Order legacy.
However, a pluralist based mediatization 
perspective will most likely broaden and 
sharpen the public’s horizons in interpreting 
media trends related to political realms in 
the Post-Authoritarian era. At the same time, 
it optimistically calls upon the media to play 
its role as one of the pillars of democracy in 
Indonesia even under the mounting challenges 
of transitional justice, corruption, oligarchy 
and cartel parties. This mediatization process 
without a doubt shows several lens of media 
relationship with complex oligarchic power 
under varying situations in Indonesia`s post-
1998 democracy, such as the business media`s 
colonization, contestation over media policy, 
and the advent of alternative internet media 
that goes beyond prevailing boundaries in 
contemporary Indonesian politics.
Moreover, mediatization of politics in 
Indonesia could clearly be explained through the 
role of KPI in the current mediatization era. This 
article started from a political economy analysis 
under Suharto’s Era and continued to explain 
how KPI played a role to determine and mediate 
the complex interactions between the media and 
political actors in Indonesia at different levels 
and situations. KPI is undeniably not a perfect 
institution to control political parties, elites and 
their private media, but it partly contributes 
to promoting media democratization in post 
reform Indonesia based on the Broadcasting 
Law 32/2002. Alternative online and social media 
also play a role in supporting deliberations 
of online democracy as well as in criticizing 
political parties, elites, and their dominant private 
media. The above activities completely took 
place under complex media-politics relations 
in the post New Order era. The role of KPI in 
regulating the media sector proved the elusive 
existence of a contestation between political 
logic and media logic under today`s oligarchic 
networks. Traditional media remains significant 
despite having been hijacked and weakened by 
political parties and their elites, whereas KPI 
at the national level is still promoting media 
logic. Alternative media is needed since they are 
trying to offer alternative media logic beyond 
mainstream media and political logic of oligarchic 
power in post-Authoritarian Indonesia. 
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